Anti-drug inspections lead to B737 loss of cabin pressure

Anti-drug inspections lead to B737 loss of cabin pressure

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Limitations of see-and-avoid, lack of warning alerts, led to Alaska midair collision

Limitations of see-and-avoid, lack of warning alerts, led to Alaska midair collision

A midair collision of two air tour airplanes was caused by “the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept” along with the absence of alerts from both airplanes’ traffic display systems, the NTSB concluded.

The two airplanes, a float-equipped DHC-2 Beaver operated by Mountain Air Service and a float-equipped DHC-3 Otter operated by Taquan Air, collided at an altitude of 3,350 feet about eight miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska, May 13, 2019. The DHC-2 pilot and four passengers died; the DHC-3 pilot suffered minor injuries, nine passengers were seriously injured, and one passenger died.

Ketchikan graphic 14APR21.jpg

Investigators determined that the pilot of the DHC-2 would not have had the opportunity to see and avoid the DHC-3 because his view was obscured by the cockpit structure, right wing and a passenger in the copilot’s seat. The lack of apparent motion of the DHC-2 when viewed from the DHC-3, and the obscuration of the DHC-2 by the window post for 11 seconds before the collision, made it difficult for the DHC-3 pilot to see the DHC-2 airplane.

Both airplanes’ traffic display systems were equipped with ADS-B Out and In.
Although the traffic display system installed on the DHC-3 depicted aircraft in the area, it could not provide aural or visual alerts to warn of a potential collision. The pilot of the DHC-3 last recalled looking at his traffic display about four minutes before the accident and did not identify any collision threats. A traffic alerting feature previously available in the DHC-3 was disabled by a 2015 equipment upgrade.

Unlike the DHC-3, the pilot of the DHC-2 airplane had access to a traffic display system that could provide aural and visual alerts, but the DHC-2 pilot would not have received any such alerts because the DHC-3 airplane was not broadcasting required altitude information.

Requiring all Part 135 operators, as well as all air tour operators in high-traffic areas, to be equipped with collision avoidance technology that provides visual and aural alerts, were two of the five new recommendations made to the FAA. The NTSB also reiterated a safety recommendation to the FAA for the sixth time in five years. That recommendation asked the agency to require all Part 135 operators to establish safety management systems. 

The post Limitations of see-and-avoid, lack of warning alerts, led to Alaska midair collision appeared first on ASN News.

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FAA issues warning for flights in Russia-Ukraine border airspace

FAA issues warning for flights in Russia-Ukraine border airspace

The FAA issued Notams (KICZ A0012/21 and A0013/21), warning U.S. airlines to review current security/threat information and to provide at least 72-hours advance notice of planned flights over airspace covering the Russian-Ukraine border.

Reason for this is the potential safety-of-flight risks associated with escalating regional tensions between Russia and Ukraine, which could potentially result in no-notice cross-border skirmishes, increased military activities, and/or conflict.

Operators are to use exercise extreme caution when flying into, out of, within, or over:

  • Dnipro FIR (UKDV),
  • Simferopol FIR (UKFV)
  • Kyiv FIR (UKBV) (includes that portion of the Kyiv Upper Information Region (UIR) (UKBE) airspace within the lateral limits of the UKDV, UKFV, and UKBV FIRs)
  • Moscow FIR (UUWV)
  • Rostov-na Donu FIR (URRV) both within 100nm of the boundaries with the Dnipro FIR (UKDV), the Simferopol FIR (UKFV), and the Kyiv FIR (UKBV) (includes that portion of the Kyiv Upper Information Region (UIR) (UKBE) airspace within the lateral limits of the UKDV, UKFV, and UKBV FIRs)

The post FAA issues warning for flights in Russia-Ukraine border airspace appeared first on ASN News.

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Loadsheet error factor in A320 tailstrike incident, Milan

Loadsheet error factor in A320 tailstrike incident, Milan

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Checklist interruption factor in Metroliner runway excursion, Canada

Checklist interruption factor in Metroliner runway excursion, Canada

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Pilot’s actions, maintenance issues contributed to fatal crash of historic B-17 airplane

Pilot’s actions, maintenance issues contributed to fatal crash of historic B-17 airplane

The National Transportation Safety Board detailed in an accident report issued April 13 the circumstances that led to the crash of a Boeing B-17G airplane that killed seven people and injured seven others.

The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was the pilot’s failure to properly manage the airplane’s configuration and airspeed following a loss of engine power.

The Word War II-era Boeing B-17G airplane had just departed Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks, Connecticut, Oct. 2, 2019, on a “living history flight experience” flight with 10 passengers when the pilot radioed controllers that the airplane was returning to the field because of an engine problem.  The airplane struck approach lights, contacted the ground before reaching the runway and collided with unoccupied airport vehicles; the majority of the fuselage was consumed by a post-crash fire.

Windsor Locks.jpg

Flightpath data indicated that during the return to the airport the landing gear was extended prematurely, adding drag to an airplane that had lost some engine power. An NTSB airplane performance study showed the B-17 could likely have overflown the approach lights and landed on the runway had the pilot kept the landing gear retracted and accelerated to 120 mph until it was evident the airplane would reach the runway.

The pilot also served as the director of maintenance for the Collings Foundation, which operated the airplane, and was responsible for the airplane’s maintenance while it was on tour in the United States. Investigators said the partial loss of power in two of the four engines was due to the pilot’s inadequate maintenance, which contributed to the cause of the accident.

The NTSB also determined that although the Collings Foundation had a voluntary safety management system in place, it was ineffective and failed to identify and mitigate numerous hazards, including the safety issues related to the pilot’s inadequate maintenance of the airplane.

The Federal Aviation Administration’s oversight of the Collings Foundation safety management system was also ineffective, the NTSB said, and cited both as contributing to the accident.

The NTSB recommended the FAA require safety management systems for the certain revenue passenger-carrying operations which included living history flight experience flights such as the B-17 flight.

The NTSB also issued recommendations to the FAA that would enhance the safety of revenue passenger-carrying operations conducted under Part 91, including those conducted with a living history flight experience exemption, which currently allows sightseeing tours aboard former military aircraft to be operated under less stringent safety standards than other commercial operations.

The post Pilot’s actions, maintenance issues contributed to fatal crash of historic B-17 airplane appeared first on ASN News.

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Ethiopian Boeing 737 lands at wrong airport in Zambia

Ethiopian Boeing 737 lands at wrong airport in Zambia

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VIP Movement Notification – Los Angeles, CA

April 05-06, 2021
Los Angeles, CA
3 NMR – 2,999 FT AGL     
 
Specific instructions and restrictions are available at * http://tfr.faa.gov once the NOTAM(s) have been issued.

*This site is informational in nature and is designed to assist pilots and aircrews for flight planning and familiarization. It may be used in conjunction with other pre-flight information sources needed to satisfy all the requirements of 14 CFR 91.103 and is not to be considered as a sole source of information to meet all pre-flight action. Due to system processing delays, recently entered NOTAMS may not be displayed.